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Abstract 
 
Advocates of extended cognition hold that the physical machinery of mind sometimes 
extends beyond the skull and skin. In the first part of this paper, I explain why, and 
more specifically the precise sense in which, consciousness presents such theorists with 
an extra hurdle to be cleared. The key challenge is posed by phenomenal consciousness, 
the what-it’s-like-ness of experience. I consider two arguments for the claim that the 
physical machinery of phenomenal consciousness sometimes extends beyond the skull 
and skin. The first – the argument from sensory substitution – suggests that acceptance 
of extended phenomenal consciousness should follow from a careful analysis of the 
phenomenon in which technological augmentation enables one sensory modality, for 
instance touch, to support the kind of environmental access and interaction ordinarily 
supported by a different sensory modality, for instance vision. The second argument – 
the argument from the relational character of experience – suggests that acceptance of 
extended phenomenal consciousness should follow from a particular conception of 
conscious experience that is mandated by sensorimotor contingency theory. I conclude 
that neither argument is decisive.      
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1.  Sunset 53rd Street 
 
Send for director Clark, because Otto, the first star of the extended cognition era, is 
ready for his close-up. Otto has one last message for (what he thinks of as) his loyal 
army of adoring fans. And here it comes: ‘it was never about consciousness’. Inga is not 
impressed. She knew that all along. Inga is, of course, Otto’s devoted companion. For 
years, she has been keeping all those nasty internalist criticisms of their celebrated (or 
notorious, depending on your point of view) thought experiment away from Otto. He 
doesn’t need to know how sceptical some people (especially Fred, Ken and Rob) have 
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been. Indeed, as far as Otto is concerned, everybody believes in extended cognition. It’s 
a little sad that Otto doesn’t know the truth, but, in Inga’s view, things are better that 
way.  
 
Musing on Otto’s words, Inga is perplexed. Why did Otto bother to say that about 
consciousness? Is there anybody out there really so injudicious as to think that the 
physical machinery of conscious experience (the processing machinery that enables us 
to be conscious of things in the world) extends beyond the brain into the non-neural 
body and the external environment? After all, she exclaims to herself, with a good deal 
of inner impatience, everybody has seen the neural imaging pictures. If there’s one 
thing we do know, it’s that the machinery of consciousness is housed entirely in the 
brain. It seems that Otto has forgotten his own plot. Maybe it’s finally time for him to 
put down the notebook. Prompted by this thought, Inga reminisces about the good old 
days. (Of course, it was Clark and Chalmers then, but David went on to other things.) 
And she wonders: what exactly is the legacy of her legendary partnership with Otto?  
 
Inga’s question is a good one, so let’s follow her down memory lane. Here’s how it was, 
back in 1998, when Clark and Chalmers introduced Inga and Otto to the world. Cue 
cinematic dissolve.1         
                                                             
1 Inga and Otto famously appeared in the canonical presentation and defence of 
extended cognition by Clark and Chalmers (1998). Clark’s own more recent treatment of 
the view may be found in (Clark 2008). For a field-defining collection that places the 
original Clark and Chalmers paper alongside a range of developments, criticisms and 
defences of the notion of extended cognition, see (Menary 2010). Fred, Ken and Rob are, 
of course, the most discussed internalist critics of extended cognition, Fred Adams, Ken 
Aizawa (e.g. Adams and Aizawa 2008) and Robert Rupert (e.g. 2009). In this paper, 
when I use the terms ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ (and ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’), 
I am referring to opposing views about the spatial location of the physical machinery of 
(alternatively, of the material vehicles that realize) cognition or consciousness. I am not 
referring to views about what determines or individuates mental content (so-called 
content internalism and content externalism). So, in the present context, the internalist 
holds that the physical machinery of cognition/consciousness (disambiguation in 
context) is wholly internal (paradigmatically, brain-bound), while the externalist holds 
that some of the physical machinery of cognition/consciousness sometimes lies beyond 
the skin. Hitting the same note, Clark (2009, 968) brings the hypothesis of extended 
consciousness into view like this: ‘the question is not whether the states of affairs that 
the conscious thought concerns are extra-neural: they nearly always are. Nor is it a 
question about what individuates the thought as, for example, a thought about a 
tooth… It is a question about what might be dubbed the machinery of mind’.       
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2. From Extended Cognition to Extended Consciousness 
 
First, the backstory: according to the hypothesis of extended cognition (henceforth ExC), 
the physical machinery of  mind sometimes extends beyond the skull and skin.2 More 
precisely, ExC is the view that there are actual (in this world) cases of intelligent 
thought and action, in which the material vehicles that realize the thinking and 
thoughts concerned are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way 
that certain external (beyond-the-skull-and-skin) factors are rightly accorded cognitive 
status. The term ‘cognitive status’ is here really just a place-holder for ‘whatever status 
it is that we standardly grant the brain, in cognitive science and naturalistic philosophy 
of mind, when talking about the causal wellsprings of intelligent thought and action’. 
On another day, more would need to be said about exactly what that means. 
 
Now for the plot: Inga is a psychologically normal individual who has committed to her 
purely organic (neural) memory the address of the New York Museum of Modern Art 
(MOMA). If she forms the desire to go to MOMA, she accesses her organic memory to 
retrieve the information that the building is on 53rd Street. Otto, on the other hand, 
suffers from an mild form of Alzheimer’s which means that he cannot internally retain 
certain kinds of factual information. He compensates for this shortcoming by recording 
salient facts in a notebook that he carries with him constantly. If Otto forms the desire to 
go to MOMA, he automatically and unhesitatingly pulls out the notebook and, without 
a hint of any critical scrutiny of the information stored within, retrieves the relevant 
fact, viz. that the museum is on 53rd Street. At this point in the drama, the so-called 
parity principle (Clark and Chalmers 1998) makes its entrance.  The parity principle 
asks us to start by considering a distributed system like Otto and his notebook, that is, a 
system (a) that generates some psychologically interesting outcome and (b) whose 
operation involves not only neural clankings and whirrings, but also an important 
functional contribution from certain externally located (with respect to the skin) 
physical elements. It then encourages us to imagine a hypothetical scenario in which the 
functional contribution identified in (b), to an equivalent outcome to the one identified 
in (a), is made not by any external elements, but by certain internally located factors. 
Having taken this imaginative step, if we then judge that the internal realizing elements 
in the latter hypothetical case count as bona fide parts of a genuinely cognitive system, 
we ought to conclude that the very same status – that is, cognitive status (see above) – 
                                                             
2  I am going to use the terms ‘mind’ and ‘cognition’ interchangeably. Although this 
upsets some philosophers, it strikes me as standard practice in cognitive science. From 
this perspective, ‘extended cognition’ and ‘the extended mind’ are alternative names for 
the same view. 
4 
 
should be granted to the external realizing elements in the environment-involving case 
with which we began. To do otherwise would be to succumb to neural chauvinism, 
which is to beg the question against the externalist. The idea is that, if we follow the 
steps just specified, in order to implement the parity principle, we should conclude that 
Otto’s memory is extended into the environment. Moreover, argue Clark and Chalmers, 
just as, prior to recalling the information in question, Inga has the non-occurrent 
dispositional belief that MOMA is on 53rd Street, so too does Otto, although while 
Inga’s belief is realized in her head, Otto’s is realized in the extended, notebook-
including system.3 
 
For present purposes, I am not in the business of determining whether Clark and 
Chalmers succeed in establishing that Otto has an extended memory and an extended 
dispositional belief. Let’s just agree that he does. I am interested in the following line of 
thought. Dispositional beliefs are paradigm cases of psychological states that are not 
conscious. A few minutes ago, I had the belief that my daughter is 9 years old, even 
though that content wasn’t part of my conscious mental life, but was merely poised to 
become so when certain triggering conditions were present, which they were when I 
wrote this sentence. So, a few minutes ago, I had the belief in unconscious dispositional 
form. A related story could be told about the unconscious status of the information that 
is stored away in memory prior to conscious recall. So, if the parity-centred argument 
rehearsed above establishes anything at all, it establishes only that certain kinds of 
                                                             
3 Interestingly, given this understanding of the parity principle (which I am confident is 
the only sensible reading of it – see Wheeler 2011a), the conclusions regarding Otto’s 
extended memory and his extended dispositional belief may be drawn without any 
reference to Inga. This is because, when we deploy the parity principle, the wholly 
internal system that plays the regulating role in driving the case for extended cognition 
is an imagined system that need not coincide with any existing example. As it happens, 
Clark and Chalmers themselves make the claim that there is a functional equivalence 
between the behaviour-governing causal role played by Otto’s notebook, and the 
behaviour-governing causal role played by the part of Inga’s brain that stores the same 
item of information. With the benefit of hindsight, this claim was, in my view, 
unfortunate, because it encouraged a host of internalist critics to hunt for functional 
differences between Otto and Inga (that is, between cases of putatively extended 
cognition and cases of extant inner cognition), in an attempt to demonstrate a lack of 
parity between the two and thereby block the externalist argument. But once the parity 
principle is understood independently of the Inga and Otto example, it seems clear 
enough that, in relation to the plotline of what that principle may or may not establish, 
this was something of a garden-path diversion. In truth, Otto always knew that Inga 
had no more than a bit part in the drama. He just didn’t like to mention it.  
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unconscious psychological phenomena may be extended. This makes sense of Clark’s 
(2009, 967) claim that ‘[the extended mind] was concerned only with the vehicles of 
non-conscious mental states such as states of dispositional believing’. (That’s why Inga 
was bemused by Otto’s pronouncement. Didn’t he know that?)   
 
Let’s now turn to the situation that obtains after Otto has looked in his notebook and is 
wending his way to 53rd street. It is possible, I think, that, in this situation, Otto may 
have an occurrent, conscious belief that remains a case of extended cognition. Perhaps 
the information that MOMA is on 53rd street never manages to lodge itself in Otto’s 
brain in any remotely stable way, while the notebook stays open and the externally 
stored information therein remains accessible, not only as a kind of anchor for his 
behaviour, but also as the material vehicle of the content of an intermittent conscious 
belief that MOMA is on 53rd Street. In other words, when instantiated – perhaps when a 
passer-by asks Otto where he is going and why he is going there – what results is a 
conscious belief that is widely realized in Otto’s brain, body and notebook.4 There are 
undoubtedly some tricky issues here, but note that the internalist cannot simply insist 
that any time Otto has the relevant conscious belief, the content must be represented in 
his brain, for fear of (once again) begging the question. That said, however, it is (at least) 
equally possible that what happens when Otto looks in his notebook and forms the 
conscious belief that MOMA is on 53rd Street is that the salient information is 
transferred to, and remains stably stored and accessible in, his brain, until he arrives at 
his destination. Of course, because of his Alzheimer’s condition, that information will 
be lost from his brain later, but nevertheless, during the relevant episodes of conscious 
belief, what we confront may be a conventional case of wholly inner consciousness.  
 
The lesson from all this uncertainty is that, whatever else the case of Inga and Otto may 
show, nothing about it decides between the two scenarios just sketched, one of which is 
externalist in form, the other of which is internalist. So, as far is this particular, but 
undeniably canonical, argument for ExC goes, the physical machinery of conscious 
experience may remain wholly internal. And although, as mentioned already, the 
agreed rules of engagement mean that the internalist is not allowed simply to insist that 
she is right, she might well suggest that existing practice in cognitive science, when 
coupled with a perfectly reasonable conservatism about scientific theory-change (i.e., 
                                                             
4 For what it’s worth, this suggestion doesn’t strike me as even remotely odd. Perhaps 
I’m weird, but sometimes, when I’m using a mobile navigation app, I could tell you the 
name of the place for which I’m heading – e.g. MOMA – but I could not tell you its 
address, unless or until I look at the app. Arguably, when I look at the app, I have the 
conscious belief that, say, MOMA is on 53rd Street, while at the other times I don’t. 
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replace an empirically fruitful existing theory only if a challenger has demonstrable 
explanatory advantages), gives her view of consciousness a kind of default status.  
 
At this juncture, the fan of extended consciousness might be moved to complain that we 
are placing too much emphasis on the Inga and Otto case. Held spellbound by their star 
billing, we are blind to other arguments for ExC that might plausibly generalize to 
consciousness. There is undoubtedly some force to this complaint. That said, here is an 
instructive general consideration. It has become a common move in the literature to link 
ExC in some way to what might be judged the house philosophy of mind in cognitive 
science, namely functionalism. Hence the fact that ExC is sometimes cashed out as 
extended functionalism (see Clark 2008a, b; followed by Wheeler 2010a, b, 2011a, 2014). 
The functionalist about cognition holds that what makes a state or process cognitive is 
not its material composition, but the functional role it plays in generating psychological 
phenomena, by intervening causally between systemic inputs, systemic outputs and 
other functionally identified, intrasystemic states and processes. Now, the fact is that 
the possibility of extended cognition is a straightforward consequence of functionalism. 
This might seem surprising because, historically, the assumption (in philosophy and 
cognitive science) has tended to be that the functionally identified states and processes 
that matter for mind, at least in the case of human beings and other minded life on 
earth, will be realized by the nervous system. In truth, however, there isn’t anything in 
the letter of functionalism that mandates this internalism (Wheeler 2010a, b).  After all, 
what functionalism requires is that we specify the causal relations that exist between 
some target element and a certain set of systemic inputs, systemic outputs and other 
functionally identified, intrasystemic elements. Nothing about this demands 
internalism, since the boundaries of the functionally identified system of interest – i.e., 
the cognitive system – may in principle fall beyond boundaries of the organic sensory-
motor interface.  
 
What this tells us is that functionalism makes extended cognition a conceptual 
possibility. Indeed, functionalism plausibly provides a theoretical backdrop for the 
operation of the parity principle. For although it is possible to conduct a debate that 
revolves around the functional contributions of certain elements without assuming 
functionalism as such (Chalmers 2008), the parity principle nevertheless does assume 
that, in principle at least, the very same type-identified cognitive state or process is 
realizable in either a purely organic medium (the imagined wholly internal system) or 
one that involves an integrated combination of organic and non-organic structures (the 
Otto-and-notebook system). In other words, the parity principle assumes that cognitive 
phenomena are multiply realizable. And even if a fan of ExC chooses to turn her back 
on the parity principle, she will presumably still want to hold onto the surely attractive 
thought that the very same type-identified cognitive process may, on some occasions, 
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take place wholly inside the head, while on others it may take place in an extended 
brain-body-environment system. Take mathematical cognition: there are some 
mathematical calculations for which it seems plausible to say that although, on 
Monday, I may carry them out using pen and paper, on Thursday I may call only on my 
organic resources. Now, if we are to describe these alternative problem-solving routines 
as two realizations of the very same type-identified process of mathematical cognition 
(which, assuming certain conditions are met, is what the advocate of ExC will be 
inclined to do), then it must be possible for the very same psychological reasoning 
process to enjoy (at least) two different material instantiations. In other words, once 
again, the target cognitive phenomenon must be multiply realizable. But if the advocate 
of ExC requires multiple realizability, it will be tempting for her to sign up to 
functionalism. For while functionalism may not be necessary for multiple realizability, 
it is standardly thought to be sufficient, since a function is something that, as we have 
seen, enjoys a particular kind of independence from its implementing material 
substrate.   
 
So far, so good, but when we turn to consciousness, this orgy of reciprocal back-
slapping between ExC and functionalism grinds to a halt. This is because, famously, the 
phenomenon of  consciousness provides functionalism with some daunting 
philosophical challenges, in the form of thought experiments such as the single system 
comprising the entire Chinese nation, organized so as to satisfy the functional definition 
of a mind (Block 1980) and the functionally-identical-to-one-of-us zombie (Chalmers 
1996). In cases such as these, the intended message is (roughly) that since we enjoy 
conscious experience, yet certain systems functionally identical to us plausibly don’t, no 
purely functional characterization can explain consciousness. In truth, rather more 
precision is needed here.  If one focusses on so-called access consciousness – where a 
state is access conscious if the information it carries is flexibly available for use in 
reasoning and the rational guidance of speech and action – then arguably the 
functionalist about the machinery of consciousness is at least in with a fighting chance. 
Access consciousness, so defined, seems to be amenable, in principle anyway, to a 
functionalist (e.g. information processing) treatment. But, if that’s so, then presumably 
extended functionalism about the machinery of consciousness is also still in the game, 
since that’s just multiple realizability playing itself out. In fact, the same guarded open-
mindedness about the prospects for extended consciousness is encouraged, I think, if 
one interprets the conscious belief enjoyed by Otto as he journeys to 53rd Street as a 
case of access consciousness. This is unsurprising, since, as we have seen, functionalism 
may provide support for the parity argument in which Otto plays his part. So the sound 
of back-slapping may still be heard. However, when we narrow our sights to 
phenomenal consciousness – that fabled what-it’s-like-ness of experience, such as what it’s 
like for me to see blue, taste wasabi peas, or, as I’m doing right now, listen to The 
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Strypes – we confront the full might of the Chinese nation and their zombie friends. It is 
here that functionalism is often thought to struggle, and to struggle badly.5  
 
If the extended functionalist is an optimist by nature, she might be tempted to spin this 
point positively. After all, if there is an explanatory gap between functionalist 
specification and phenomenal consciousness, that gap obtains whether the realizing 
machinery is wholly neural or an extended matrix of elements in the brain, the non-
neural body, and the beyond-the-skin environment. It’s the functional basis of the 
explanation that causes the difficulty, not where the realizing machinery happens to be 
spatially located. So although functionalism may indeed struggle in the face of 
phenomenal consciousness, extending one’s functionalism doesn’t make things any 
worse than they already were.  
 
Unfortunately, at first sight, this sort of positive spin looks to be nigh on baseless. After 
all, being no worse off than someone who has no idea at all is hardly a victory. 
However, perhaps this is a case where first impressions are misleading. To see why, we 
can draw on an analysis due to Hurley (2010), in which she exposes a tension between 
two widely held intuitions regarding the machinery of phenomenal consciousness.6 The 
first of these intuitions is the internalist intuition, which is that if phenomenal qualities 
can be realized physically or functionally at all, it could only be in terms of internal 
factors. Hence all the fuss in cognitive neuroscience and naturalistic philosophy of mind 
about the neural correlates of consciousness. The second intuition is what Hurley calls 
the autonomy metaintuition. This is Hurley’s recoding of the alleged explanatory gap 
highlighted above. Thus, in general terms, ‘[the] autonomy metaintuition for 
phenomenal qualities is an expression of the intuition that there is an intractable 
explanatory gap between physical or functional properties and phenomenal qualities’ 
(Hurley 2010, 104). Applied specifically to the machinery of phenomenal consciousness, 
the autonomy metaintuition is an expression of bewilderment about precisely how any 
suite of purely physical or functional states and processes could realize phenomenal 
consciousness. The tension between these two intuitions is clear enough. To echo some 
of Hurley’s own rhetorical words, if we have no understanding of how phenomenal 
qualities could be realized in neural elements, why is the conditional intuition so strong 
                                                             
5 The distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness is due to Block (1995). 
6 As I shall explicate it here, the tension in question concerns intuitions about the 
machinery of phenomenal consciousness. Hurley herself initially explicates the tension 
as concerning intuitions about what determines phenomenal quality, but she is clear 
that the tension surfaces at the level of machinery too (Hurley 2010, 148 n.10; for further 
discussion, see Wheeler 2015). The distinction between the ‘what-determines’ and the 
‘machinery’ levels of analysis will be relevant later in this paper.    
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that if phenomenal qualities can be realized physically or functionally at all, it could 
only be in terms of internal (neural) factors?  
 
Notice that, in the wake of this tension, it’s the autonomy metaintuition that cuts the 
ground from under the feet of the internalist intuition, rather than the other way round. 
This becomes clear if we try to express the tension differently, by formulating it as 
follows: if it is true that, if phenomenal qualities can be realized physically or 
functionally at all, it could only be in terms of internal (neural) factors,  why is the 
intuition so strong that we have no understanding of how phenomenal qualities could 
be realized in neural elements? This thought is suspect, because the claim that 
phenomenal qualities must be realized in neural elements sheds no light on how that 
might be true. Put another way, the bald commitment to internalism does not 
undermine the explanatory gap. On the other hand, the explanatory gap does 
undermine the bald commitment to internalism. That, I think, is why Hurley expresses 
the tension the way round that she does. Of course, this analysis doesn’t favour 
externalism about the machinery of phenomenal consciousness over internalism – 
because the autonomy metaintuition applies to purely physical or functional properties, 
wherever they are located – but it does level the playing field. For it suggests that, when 
it comes to the machinery of phenomenal consciousness, the prior plausibility of 
internalism and externalism (prior, that is, to further philosophical argument and 
empirical investigation) turns out to be equal. And what this means is that the 
previously-lodged claim by the internalist, that her view has default status in the debate 
(see above), is rendered insecure. In truth, neither internalism nor externalism about the 
machinery of phenomenal consciousness enjoys that privileged status. Game on.  
 
For the remainder of this paper, I will be concerned only with phenomenal 
consciousness. According to the hypothesis of extended phenomenal consciousness 
(henceforth ExPC), there are actual (in this world) cases of phenomenal consciousness 
in which the material vehicles that realize the phenomenally conscious states and 
processes concerned are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way 
that certain external (beyond-the-skull-and-skin) factors are rightly accorded whatever 
status it is that we standardly grant the brain, in cognitive science and naturalistic 
philosophy of mind, when talking about the causal wellsprings of phenomenal 
consciousness. If ExPC is true, although the machinery that realizes conscious 
phenomenal experience includes, and maybe necessarily includes, neural elements, it is 
not restricted to such elements. There will be cases in which that machinery additionally 
includes not only non-neural bodily elements, but also elements located beyond the 
skull and skin. To keep our thinking straight, it is worth emphasizing the fact that 
ExPC, as we are conceiving it, does not entail that the worldly object or state of affairs 
that one is phenomenally conscious of is part of the relevant machinery. The objects of 
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phenomenal consciousness may remain external to the machinery of such 
consciousness, even if the machinery is now partly external with respect to the brain 
and body.  
 
So, should we accept ExPC? In the space available here, I cannot hope to review all the 
treatments of this question that appear in the literature.7 So I shall concentrate on 
assessing just two arguments that, if sound, would produce affirmative answers, and I 
shall comment on a connection between them. These arguments are what I shall call the 
argument from sensory substitution and the argument from the relational character of 
experience.    
 
3. The Argument from Sensory Substitution8 
 
Sensory substitution, as it will concern us here, occurs when technological 
augmentation enables one sensory modality to support the kind of environmental 
access and interaction ordinarily supported by a different sensory modality. The 
seminal work in this area is Paul Bach y Rita’s (1972; Bach y Rita and Kercel 2002) 
research on tactile-vision sensory substitution (henceforth TVSS). In this work, blind 
subjects were equipped with a head- or shoulder-mounted camera that conveyed 
information, from video images, via the activation of an array of vibrators located on 
the subject’s back, abdomen or thigh. After a short period of adaptation, those TVSS 
subjects who actively controlled the information received, either by manipulating their 
bodies or by manipulating the camera, were able to make reliable judgments about 
things such as the number, relative size and position of distal objects in three-
dimensional space, and to perform actions such as reaching out and picking up objects. 
TVSS subjects have also been successful at making perceptual judgments involving 
effects such as looming and object occlusion, and (this time with image-sourced 
information transmitted via vibrators on the tongue) have reported experiencing 
illusory movement effects such as the waterfall illusion  (Bach y Rita and Kercel  2002). 
TVSS is not the only form of sensory substitution. For example, in auditory-vision 
substitution (e.g. Auvray et al. 2005), video images from a camera are converted into 
                                                             
7 Most notably, I shall not discuss the prominent pro-ExPC arguments offered by 
Hurley and Noë (2003), the criticisms of those arguments lodged by Clark, or Clark’s 
own positive argument against extended consciousness (Clark 2009). I comment on the 
last of these in (Wheeler 2015, 131 n.2).   
8 This section develops a variation on an argument that I first offered in (Wheeler 2015). 
In the present treatment, various aspects of that argument have been reorganized and 
enhanced. In that prior paper, I additionally consider (and reject) a different modulation 
of the argument from sensory substitution due to Kiverstein and Farina (2013).       
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sounds (e.g. the vertical positions of pixels may be correlated with different audio 
frequencies) and conveyed to the subject via headphones. Again after short periods of 
adaptation, subjects equipped with such devices have been able to localize, and to 
recognize the shapes of, distal objects in three-dimensional space.   
 
Noë (2009) argues that a careful analysis of sensory substitution indicates that we 
should accept ExPC. As I understand it, the reasoning goes like this: (i) sensory 
substitution involves a transformation in perceptual experience; (ii) that transformation 
is achieved without there being any change in the underpinning neural activity; (iii) if 
we assume internalism about the machinery of phenomenal consciousness, the 
transformation in question is, from the perspective of naturalism, mysterious; (iv) if we 
adopt ExPC (i.e., externalism about the machinery of phenomenal consciousness), the 
transformation is naturalistically explicable; (v) given some target domain of 
phenomena, we should defeasibly accept the existence of those states and processes that 
are required by the most powerful explanations that we have available in that domain;9 
(vi) we should accept ExPC. As we shall see, steps (i) and (ii) are explicit in Noë’s 
treatment of the issue. Steps (iii)-(v) admittedly involve some creative filling-in on my 
part, but are implicit in, or at least consistent with, Noë’s approach and would be 
sufficient to complete the argument. The conclusion, (vi), is expressed by Noë in his 
claim that ‘the world itself can be described as belonging to the very machinery of our 
own consciousness’ (Noë 2009, 65). 
              
Let’s start with (i). Some blind users of sensory substitution systems report experiences 
that might be categorized as visual qualia, such as experiences of phosphenes (the 
seeing of light without light actually entering the eye) (Ortiz et al. 2011). It is because of 
such reports that Noë (2009, 57) plausibly understands TVSS, thought of as a 
paradigmatic instance of sensory substitution, to be a ‘full-fledged, bona fide example 
of… [a] transformation in perceptual consciousness’. What Noë means by a 
‘transformation in perceptual consciousness’ is that there has been a transition in 
experience from one sensory modality to another. The most straightforward (but also 
most controversial) claim in the vicinity here would be that post-adaptation TVSS 
subjects genuinely see (enjoy authentic visual phenomenal consciousness), in spite of 
the fact that the relevant channel of proximal stimulation is tactile (vibrations on the 
skin caused by the TVSS technology). In truth, however, Noë doesn’t need such a 
radical claim, in order to construct his argument for ExPC. All he needs is that TVSS 
engenders a transformation in perceptual consciousness such that, even though the 
proximal stimuli remain tactile in character, the post-adaptation conscious experience in 
question is not correctly categorized as one of touch, even if it isn’t vision (Noë 2009, 
                                                             
9 My formulation of this principle is indebted to (Rupert 2013).   
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p.62). Given the perceptual sensitivity of TVSS subjects to distal objects, and given that 
touch standardly involves perceptual sensitivity through surface-to-surface contact 
(pressure reception), that much certainly seems to be defensible.  
 
Step (ii) in Noë’s argument is the claim that the kind of transformation in perceptual 
consciousness just described is achieved without there being any change in the neural 
activity underpinning it. As Noë (2009, 54) puts it, the ‘character of conscious 
experience can vary even though the neural activity underpinning it does not change’. 
Taking it that the kinds of variation in conscious experience that matter here are those 
that involve transitions in perceptual consciousness from one sensory modality to 
another, what does Noë mean by a ‘change in underpinning neural activity’? An 
answer to this question is suggested by the following observation. According to Noë 
(2009, p.56), TVSS cases show that ‘[neural] rewiring isn’t necessary for changes 
[transformations] in conscious experience’. In other words, the marker for a change in 
underpinning neural activity is neural rewiring. The inspiration here comes from 
experiments on neural plasticity due to Sur and colleagues (Sur et al.1999, described by 
Noë 2009, 53-4). In these experiments, the neurophysiology of new-born ferrets was 
rewired so that their eyes ended up being connected to the parts of their brains 
ordinarily used for hearing. The result was that those regions of the ferret brain that 
standardly process auditory information were recruited for vision. This constitutes a 
transformation in sensory experience of the right kind (from one modality to another), 
and it is obvious that an important factor in effecting that transformation was neural 
rewiring. In fact, if there were any neural rewiring in the TVSS case (which Noë claims 
there isn’t), it would presumably not be quite the same as that in evidence in the ferret 
model. The TVSS phenomenon would require not that the path from a proximal input 
be rewired so as to recruit a different part of the brain to the proximal input’s standard 
sensory modality, but rather that the path from a proximal input be rewired so as to 
activate a different part of the brain to usual, so as to produce experiences in that part of 
the brain’s standard sensory modality. However, one gets the idea: the relevant sense of 
a ‘change in underpinning neural activity’ is a physical modification to the wiring of the 
brain.10         
                                                             
10 To head off a possible exegetical challenge, let me register the fact that Noë’s 
statement that the ‘character of conscious experience can vary even though the neural 
activity underpinning it does not change’ actually appears not during his discussion of 
TVSS, but during his discussion of Sur’s ferrets. Indeed, Noë (2009, 54) describes it as 
‘the basic lesson of Sur’s studies’. To my mind this is an odd remark, since, as we have 
seen, in the ferret case, there is a change in neural activity, in the sense of neural 
rewiring. This might make one suspicious that whatever Noë means by a ‘change in 
neural activity’, at least in connection with Sur’s ferrets, it can’t be neural rewiring. One 
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Why precisely is neural rewiring supposed to be ruled out as an explanation of the 
transformation in perceptual consciousness present in TVSS? For one thing, TVSS 
subjects adapt swiftly to their augmenting devices, with the transition in experiential 
sensory modality happening far too quickly for the explanation to turn on the kind of 
substantial neural rewiring that we see in the ferret case. For another, TVSS subjects are 
typically adult human beings whose brains simply do not have the plasticity exhibited 
by the brains of new-born ferrets. With thoughts such as these in the background, Noë 
describes the post-adaptation TVSS scenario as follows:  
  
Stimulation of the skin gives rise to neural activity in touch areas of the brain 
(the so-called somatasensory cortex). But for a person who has adapted to the 
sensory substitution system, activation in somatasensory touch areas gives 
rise not to the experience of being touched (or at least not only to the feeling 
of being touched) but to a visual experience of the scene in front of him. (Noë 
2009, 58) 
 
If this is right, then point (ii) of Noë’s argument goes through: what TVSS cases indicate 
is that, in the relevant sense, a change in underpinning neural activity isn’t necessary for 
a transformation in perceptual consciousness.  
 
Points (iii) and (iv) do their ExPC-supporting work as a team. Given that what Noë 
means by a change in the underpinning neural activity is neural rewiring, and given 
that no neural rewiring has taken place in the TVSS case, there has been a 
transformation in perceptual consciousness without any change in the underpinning 
neural activity. If we then assume internalism (neuro-centrism) about the physical 
                                                             
possibility is that, for Noë, there is no change in neural activity in the ferret case 
because, post rewiring, cells in (what would normally be) auditory cortex remain active, 
even though they now underlie visual experiences. On this alternative interpretation, ‘a 
change in neural activity’ would require that a different area of the brain become active. 
For present purposes, it really wouldn’t matter if we did interpret the target phrase in 
this way, since, as we are about to see (in the main text), Noë claims that TVSS cases 
involve no change in neural activity in this sense too, and so there would be no 
implications for my subsequent argument. However, my favoured interpretation, 
according to which a change in neural activity demands neural rewiring, fits 
significantly better with the observation that Sur’s ferrets are examples of neural 
plasticity (Noë 2009, 53, 58), which naturally indicates a change in neural activity. 
Moreover, there’s no doubt that, for  Noë, TVSS cases involve no change in neural 
activity in the sense of there having been no neural rewiring.    
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machinery of phenomenal consciousness, and also that any perspective worthy of the 
name ‘naturalism’ rules out substance dualism, then it seems that we have no 
naturalistic explanation of the target transformation. So, from the perspective of 
naturalism, what confronts us is a mystery. That’s point (iii). If, by contrast, we accept 
externalism about the physical machinery of phenomenal consciousness, then it’s the 
addition of some new externally-located realizing factors, in the guise of the TVSS-
delivering technology, that promises to supply the missing naturalistic explanation. 
That’s point (iv). But now, assuming the surely reasonable principle that, given some 
target domain of phenomena, we should defeasibly accept the existence of those states 
and processes that are required by the most powerful explanations that we have 
available in that domain (point (v)), we are permitted to draw the conclusion that we 
should accept ExPC (point (vi)).    
 
With the whole argument in place (including the parts that tend to be hidden in Noë’s 
own treatment), one can appreciate, I think, why Noë concentrates on a case of sensory 
substitution to provide his model of a technology-driven transformation in perceptual 
consciousness (yielding the requirement that the transformation occur between sensory 
modalities), rather than on an example such as improving poor eyesight by putting on 
the right spectacles (which would yield a technology-driven transformation in 
perceptual consciousness within a single sensory modality). The proposal that the latter 
may occur without any neural rewiring engenders no sense of mystery analogous to the 
sense of mystery generated at point (iii) in the argument as stated. And what that means 
is that no momentum is established to include the spectacles as a constitutive part of the 
realizing machinery of phenomenal consciousness, as opposed to a causal input to such 
machinery, with the machinery itself remaining internal.  
 
How should we respond to the argument from sensory substitution? I think we should 
grant points (i), (iv) and (v). TVSS cases do involve a transformation in sensory 
experience from one modality to another, ExPC would provide a genuine naturalistic 
explanation of the phenomenon, and we should let our metaphysics be guided by our 
best explanations. However, I shall argue that Noë’s own way of unpacking point (ii) – 
the claim that the relevant transformation is achieved without there being any change in 
the underpinning neural activity – seriously under-estimates the naturalistic theoretical 
resources available to the internalist. With those resources brought into view, point (ii) 
falls, and with it point (iii). There is a change in the underpinning neural activity, so 
there remains a perfectly respectable internalist account of the transformation in 
question and internalism does not result in any mystery. The consequence is that the 
argument from sensory substitution to ExPC fails, because internalism and externalism 
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are back on the level playing field instituted by Hurley’s reflections on the autonomy 
metaintuition.11  
 
As we have seen, according to Noë, the claim that the relevant transformation in 
phenomenal consciousness is achieved without there being any change in the 
underpinning neural activity should be interpreted as the claim that there has been no 
ferret-style neural rewiring. But this sort of rewiring surely does not exhaust the idea of 
a change in the underpinning neural activity. For example, let’s assume that what 
results from adaptation to TVSS technology is a fundamental change in the 
mathematical structure of the neural activation patterns in somatasensory cortex. We 
know, from well-established connectionist research in artificial intelligence and 
cognitive science, that phase transitions in the activation dynamics of neural-style 
networks can generate very different systemic behaviour, without any structural 
reconfiguration of the units and connections (without any neural rewiring). It is far 
from crazy to think that such phase transitions might produce transformations in the 
modality of the perceptual experience, from, say, touch to vision or quasi-vision. 
Indeed, as long as we continue to hang on to functionalism as our explanatory creed, 
such a possibility looks eminently sensible. And even if, with the zombies at the door, 
one doesn’t want to be quite so gung-ho about functionalism, Hurley’s autonomy 
metaintuition (this time deployed in the service of internalism) might serve to blunt any 
worries. For if we have no understanding of how phenomenal qualities could be 
realized in physical or functional elements, why is the intuition so strong that if 
phenomenal qualities can be realized physically at all, that realization must be specified 
at the level of neural wiring, rather than at the level of patterns of activation? I conclude 
that the argument from sensory substitution, as stated, gives us no decisive reason to 
accept ExPC.     
 
4. The Argument from the Relational Character of Experience 
 
So far I have considered the argument from sensory substitution in isolation from Noë’s 
enactivist view that perceptual experience is constituted by implicit knowledge of what 
he calls sensorimotor contingencies – the law-like effects that either my movement or the 
                                                             
11 Another way of responding to Noë’s argument would be to submit empirical 
evidence that, in TVSS subjects, some region of the brain other than somatasensory 
cortex – a region such as visual cortex that might plausibly realize the transformed 
phenomenal quality – is  somehow activated crossmodally along with somatasensory 
cortex. I discuss this strategy in (Wheeler 2015). For today I want to grant Noë as much 
as possible, including the claim that it is somatasensory cortex alone that is activated by 
the TVSS technology.    
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movements of objects in my sensory field have on the sensory input that I receive (see 
e.g. Noë 2004, 2009; O’Regan and Noë 2001). Although this respects the fact that, in his 
2009 discussion of sensory substitution, Noë draws the externalist conclusion before 
introducing sensorimotor contingency theory (Noë 2009, 58-9), perhaps this is a 
mistake. Sensorimotor contingency theory is certainly marshalled, by Noë, as part of the 
wider context in which the argument from sensory substitution is developed. So 
perhaps the heavy lifting in the case for ExPC is in reality performed by sensorimotor 
contingency theory, and ultimately by its commitment to what I shall call the relational 
character of experience. Let’s see how this might work.        
 
A nice illustration of the sensorimotor contingency approach to perceptual experience is 
provided by Noë’s response to Dennett’s wall of Marylins example (Dennett 1991; Noë 
2004, 54-9). Imagine walking into a room where the wallpaper features nothing other 
than a repeated identical image of Marylin Monroe’s face, in the style of Andy Warhol’s 
famous silkscreen paintings. If anyone asks you about your visual experience, you will 
presumably report that you see a wall of identical Marylins. But although that is how 
you will report your experience, there is a snag. To see any particular Marylin would 
require foveating on it, since peripheral vision simply doesn’t deliver information of 
sufficient detail. However, the human visual system functions in such a way that you 
would be able to foveate on only a tiny number of the available images at any one time. 
So what explains your conscious report of seeing a wall of Marylins? Noë’s account 
goes like this: while one is attentively gazing at any particular point on the wall, one 
doesn’t in fact have a high-definition visual impression of a wall covered in identical 
Marylins. What one has is (a) a high-definition visual impression of a tiny part of the 
wall containing a Marylin or two, plus (b) a sense that there are other Marylins present, 
in part because one knows implicitly that one could access them if one actively looked around, 
that is, because one has mastery of certain sensorimotor contingencies.  
 
Importantly, the sensorimotor contingency approach plausibly has the resources to 
explain the fact that TVSS subjects have experiences that are vision-like in at least some 
respects, since the sensorimotor contingencies in play in TVSS involve relations 
characteristic of visual phenomena such as looming and occlusion effects. If that is right, 
then we have a good reason to add sensorimotor-contingency theory to the mix. And if 
that theory licences externalism about the machinery of phenomenal consciousness, 
then we have a new argument for ExPC. But how do we connect sensorimotor 
contingency theory with externalism in this way? The first step is the observation that 
sensorimotor contingency theory requires a relational conception of phenomenally 
conscious experience. This seems clear: for the sensorimotor contingency theorist, 
conscious perceptual experience essentially involves mastery of law-like relations 
between movement and sensory input. The second and final step is to claim that the 
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relationality of perceptual consciousness licences ExPC (Ward 2012). This is the 
argument from the relational character of experience.     
 
Before we turn to the details of this argument, we need to deflect an in-principle worry. 
If we follow the lead of some thinkers in this area, the proposed appeal to relationality 
will establish the wrong conclusion, because it will secure not the extended (in space) 
character of the machinery of phenomenal consciousness, but rather the blanket non-
spatiality of the phenomenon. In other words, phenomenal consciousness isn’t extended, 
or indeed wholly internal, since, in truth, it isn’t anywhere. Thus Froese et al. claim that 
‘[i]f cognition [consciousness] is a relational phenomenon, it logically cannot be located 
inside the brain (or anywhere)’ (Froese et al. 2013, 1420; for similar claims, see di Paolo 
2009, Thompson and Stapleton 2009). Here one shouldn’t be distracted by the fact that 
Froese et al. make their claim explicitly about cognition rather than consciousness. The 
allegedly compelling inference is from relationality to non-spatiality, so any relational 
phenomenon will be non-spatial, and, on the sensorimotor account, perceptual 
experience is relational. If this is right, the argument from the relational character of 
experience to ExPC is a non-starter.   
 
Fortunately, it’s the inference from relationality to non-spatiality that, it seems to me, 
fails to leave the blocks (Wheeler 2011b). Consider: towing is a phenomenon that 
constitutively involves a relation or set of relations (e.g. between two cars and a rope), 
but there seems no doubt that towing takes place in space and that the realizing vehicle 
(or vehicles) are located in space. In other words, even though towing is constitutively a 
relational phenomenon, the machinery of towing is spatial.12 Examples of this sort could 
surely be multiplied indefinitely. Of course, as Thompson (2011, 218) notes, ‘it does not 
make sense to think of cognition [or consciousness] as spatially located in the way that 
the “vehicles” enabling cognitive processes [or consciousness]  are spatially located’, 
but that’s just fine. It’s the spatiality of the vehicles (the machinery) that’s needed for 
ExPC. One might clarify the point here using conceptual material borrowed, once more, 
from Hurley (2010), who draws a distinction between claims about what determines 
phenomenal quality and claims about how those qualities are materially realized. 
Framed in terms of this distinction, which is, of course, closely related to other 
distinctions in the vicinity, such as the personal-subpersonal distinction and the 
constitutive-enabling distinction (e.g. McDowell 1994), what we have just learned is that 
even if phenomenal consciousness is relationally constituted at the what level, it can be 
spatially located at the how level. And with relationality and spatiality back on the 
same side, one is free to argue that relationality at the what level entails externalism at 
                                                             
12 Thanks to Peter Sullivan for the towing example. 
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the how level, that is, that the relational character of experience entails that we accept 
ExPC.  
 
But why should the relational character of experience at the what level have externalist 
consequences for our understanding the machinery of phenomenal consciousness? The 
driving thought here is that what-level relationality is inconsistent with how-level 
(machinery-level) internalism. Here is Ward (2012, 746): ‘[i]f we adopt the 
[sensorimotor] enactivist’s conception of experience as a relationship between perceiver 
and environment then the subpersonal [how level, mechanistic] underpinnings of 
experience must include more than the internal properties of the subject, since those 
properties leave it underdetermined whether the requisite relationship obtains’. 
Although I do not have the space here to do justice to all the subtleties of Ward’s 
discussion, as far as I can tell, and in general terms, his argument faces the following 
dilemma: we can interpret the idea of ‘the requisite relationship obtaining’ so that it 
delivers the intended inconsistency, but then the resulting relational view of experience 
has an unpalatable consequence; or we can interpret that idea in a way that avoids the 
unpalatable consequence, but then the intended inconsistency does not materialize.  
 
To explain: Let’s begin by interpreting the idea of ‘the requisite relationship obtaining’ 
as demanding that, for the sensorimotor contingency theorist, a conscious experience 
happens when and only when the organism actually interacts with its environment. On 
this view, assuming that the wall of Marylins is stationary, having a conscious 
experience of that object requires actively looking around, so that the relevant 
sensorimotor contingencies are actually traversed. Given this unpacking of the key 
phrase, ExPC would indeed follow from the relational character of experience, since any 
appeal to purely internal machinery could, at best, tell us only that the organism is in a 
state such that, if certain appropriate interactions were to take place, it would have a 
conscious experience. But this has the unpalatable consequence that there is no 
perceptual consciousness without behaviour, which flies in the face not only of 
intuition, but also of Noë’s claim that what matters for perceptual experience (e.g. of a 
wall of Marylins) is the sense the perceiver has that certain sensory inputs are accessible, 
that is, available if one looked around. We can avoid the unpalatable consequence, and 
thereby stay closer to what Noë says about the wall of Marylins case, by interpreting the 
idea of ‘the requisite relationship obtaining’ as demanding only that the organism be 
poised to masterfully traverse the relevant sensorimotor contingencies. On this view, 
having a conscious experience of the wall of Marylins requires only knowing implicitly 
that one could access more Marylins if one actively looked around. Now, however, 
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there seems to be no barrier to understanding such knowledgeable readiness to act as 
fully compatible with internalism about the realizing machinery.13  
 
It is important to stress that the foregoing dilemma exists only for the advocate of the 
argument from the relational character of experience. Someone enamoured with the 
relational character of experience who wishes to be an internalist about the machinery 
of phenomenal consciousness can cheerily follow the second option. Moreover, I 
suspect that there is a perfectly good further relationalist option out there in 
philosophical space, which is to develop the notion of experiential relationality at the 
what level of analysis in such a way that it has no implications whatsoever for the 
outcome of the internalism-externalism debate over the underlying physical machinery. 
What does seem clear, however, is that the argument from the relational character of 
experience gives us no decisive reason to accept ExPC.     
 
5. Endings and Beginnings  
 
In the opening scene of Sunset Boulevard, the body of murdered scriptwriter Joe Gillis 
floats lifeless in the swimming pool of Norma Desmond’s mansion. Is a similar fate 
awaiting the fan of extended consciousness? I have certainly not argued for the general 
conclusion that the machinery of consciousness is always wholly internal. Rather, I have 
sought to bring some clarification to the structure of the debate and to expose the 
shortcomings of two arguments for extended phenomenal consciousness – the 
argument from sensory substitution and the argument from the relational character of 
experience. If I am right, these arguments fall short. So my interim report on extended 
consciousness is that, if the externalist goal in this arena is to establish that the physical 
machinery underpinning the what-it’s-like-ness of experience is extended beyond the 
skin, then different arguments will be needed. The internalist is certainly not home and 
dry, but the externalist has significant work to do. Still, if there had been a sequel to 
Sunset Boulevard, maybe we would have discovered that Joe survived.    
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